Florida · Late notice
The Late-Notice Expert Report: What Florida's Second District Just Approved
Nine elements, six graded affidavits, and the one sentence every report that survived contained.
Photo: U.S. Department of Homeland Security / FEMA
In short
Florida's Second District reversed summary judgment for a carrier on a claim reported 1,053 days after Hurricane Irma, even though the engineer's causation affidavit disclosed a remote, live-streamed roof inspection. Comparing that affidavit against five other published Florida late-notice opinions shows nine elements that separate the ones that survive summary judgment from the ones that don't.
The engineer whose affidavit became the first late-notice causation report a Florida appellate court has walked element by element and held sufficient never set foot on the roofs he opined about. His firm's residential roof inspector climbed them over five days in October 2021, live-streaming with two-way audio so the engineer could call for specific angles as the camera moved, and the engineer disclosed that arrangement in the affidavit itself. 1 The Second District reversed summary judgment for the carrier anyway, on a claim reported 1,053 days after Hurricane Irma. 1
What the Second District actually held
American Coastal's policy did not give prompt notice its own paragraph. It gathered notice with the rest of the insured's post-loss obligations under one prefatory clause: there is "no duty to provide coverage … if the failure to comply with the following duties is prejudicial to us." 1 The panel read that clause as written. Where prejudice is a stated condition of the coverage defense, the carrier carries it, and the common-law presumption of prejudice that ordinarily follows unreasonably late notice never attaches at all. That reading puts the Second District in express conflict with Arce v. Citizens Property Insurance Co., 388 So. 3d 205, 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024), which rejected the same policy-language argument, and the court certified the conflict. 7 If you are tracking that fight on its own terms, the burden split between the districts is the piece to follow.
The court then gave an alternative holding, and for anyone building a file that is the useful half. Assume the presumption applies. The expert evidence still rebutted it and still created a jury question on substantial prejudice under Bankers Insurance Co. v. Macias, 475 So. 2d 1216, 1217-18 (Fla. 1985). 10 The trial court had called the expert's opinions "unsupported generalizations, void of any meaningful quantitative analysis, conclusory, inconsistent and overly simplistic," and his storm differentiation "frankly, preposterous," and had described the delay as "clear and obvious prejudice." 1 Those are credibility findings dressed as sufficiency findings. Citing Lassiter v. Citizens Property Insurance Corp., 386 So. 3d 646, 651-52 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024), Judge Black's opinion reminded the bench that "a motion for summary judgment is not a trial by affidavit or deposition." 8
Note the sequencing on the deadline question, because adjusters get this backwards constantly. Fla. Stat. § 627.70132 and the policy's prompt-notice duty are independent gates. Wild Oak Bay's notice at 1,053 days landed inside the then-applicable three-year windstorm bar set by ch. 2011-39, and the Second District still treated the notice as untimely as a matter of law under the policy. 111 Clearing the statute buys nothing on the contract. The statutory side has since tightened twice, to two years for all perils under ch. 2021-77 and then to one year with an 18-month supplemental window under ch. 2022-271, which is the regime governing every new Florida catastrophe claim calendar you are running now. 11
Nine elements, six affidavits
Six late-notice causation affidavits have been graded on their content in published Florida appellate opinions. Three survived summary judgment; three did not. The survivors all did one thing the failures never did: they gave the court a physical reason why a roof examined years after the storm could still be read reliably, stated in terms specific to that roof rather than to roofs in general. Read against each other, the graded content sorts into nine elements.
- Named-storm meteorological data tied to the specific property, not to the county or the region.
- Wind speed or pressure measured or modeled at the property address.
- A quantified failure threshold for the specific building component at issue.
- An engineering standard named and versioned.
- A named alternative cause affirmatively ruled out.
- Age-of-damage physical differentiation: morphology, patina, strike angle.
- Inspection method and personal-knowledge basis disclosed.
- An express, case-specific statement that elapsed time did not impair the analysis.
- No concession of an alternative or ongoing cause.
Nine is a description of the record, not a checklist a court has endorsed. No Florida opinion recites these. They are what the graded affidavits contained or lacked when a panel explained why the affidavit worked. The six, in order of decision: Kramer v. State Farm Florida Insurance Co., 95 So. 3d 303, 306-07 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); Stark v. State Farm Florida Insurance Co., 95 So. 3d 285, 287-88 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); Perez v. Citizens Property Insurance Corp., 343 So. 3d 140, 143 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022); Shapiro v. First Protective Insurance Co., 359 So. 3d 777, 781-82 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023); You Restorations, LLC v. First Protective Insurance Co., 417 So. 3d 365, 368 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025); and SFR Services, LLC a/a/o Wild Oak Bay Owners Ass'n v. American Coastal Insurance Co., No. 2D2024-1947 (Fla. 2d DCA July 22, 2026). Wild Oak Bay has no Southern Reporter page yet, so pull it by docket number as a slip opinion. 1
| Wild Oak Bay | Stark | Shapiro | Perez 3d | Kramer | You Rest. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Named-storm data at the property | ✓ | ✕ | ~ | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ |
| 2. Wind speed or pressure at the property | ✓ | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | ? |
| 3. Quantified failure threshold | ✓ | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | ? |
| 4. Engineering standard named and versioned | ✓ | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | ? |
| 5. Named alternative cause ruled out | ✓ | ~ | ~ | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ |
| 6. Age-of-damage differentiation | ✓ | ~ | ✓ | ✕ | ~ | ? |
| 7. Inspection method disclosed | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ~ | ~ |
| 8. Elapsed time did not impair the analysis | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✕ | ~ | ? |
| 9. No concession of another cause | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✕ | ✕ |
| Outcome at summary judgment | survived | survived | survived | failed | failed | failed |
The tallies do not distribute evenly. Element 8 appears in all three affidavits that survived. Among the three that failed, the Third District's Perez affidavit lacks it, Kramer's contains only a partial version, and the You Restorations opinion is silent on the point. The contrast is the sharpest in the matrix without being a clean split, because a silent cell is not evidence of absence. Element 9 is where two of the three losers destroyed themselves from the inside: an alternative cause you cannot eliminate has to be carved out of the claimed scope, not acknowledged and left standing next to your opinion. Elements 2, 3, and 4 — the quantitative ones — appear in Wild Oak Bay and in no other opinion that describes what the affidavit contained; You Restorations says nothing either way. 1 Element 7 does not discriminate at all: the affidavit built on a documented personal site visit lost, and the one built on a live-streamed inspection the expert never attended in person won.

NOAA data is in the winning report and the losing one
In the Third District's Perez, the insured's investigator physically inspected the property on July 24, 2020, on a claim reported 732 days after the loss, and produced a report resting on the insured's statements and "a review of historic NOAA weather data." 5 Its operative sentence: "[T]he severe storm event that occurred on/or about the reported date of loss was the probable storm event that caused the documented roof damage." 5 The report never names the storm. The Third District called the affidavit wholly conclusory and affirmed. Wild Oak Bay's expert pulled NOAA too, and then spent the report converting it into physics at the address: roughly 50 miles from Irma's eye, about 70 mph measured wind at the property, ASCE 7-10 velocity-pressure calculations, and the tiles' own uplift failure threshold of 9 to 10 psf against a lowest modeled pressure at the property of 26 psf, nearly three times the threshold. 1
Which brings the site-visit inversion into focus. Perez's investigator stood on the property on a stated date and lost. 5 Wild Oak Bay's expert never climbed a roof across 55 buildings inspected October 18 through 22, 2021, and won, because he explained the circumstance instead of papering over it. 1 Physical presence was never the variable. Disclosed method was. Ordinary roof documentation practice runs on the same rule: the record has to show how you know, on the date you knew it.
Two Perez opinions, opposite propositions
Perez v. Citizens Property Insurance Corp., 343 So. 3d 140 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022), holds an insured's causation affidavit wholly conclusory. 5 Perez v. Citizens Property Insurance Co., 345 So. 3d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022), holds the burden of proving prejudice sat on the insurer. 6 Two 2022 opinions captioned against Citizens, pointing opposite directions. Check the district and the reporter page before you cite either.
Element 8 is the one to steal. Wild Oak Bay's expert testified at deposition that "[i]f [someone] broke a tile the day after Irma, it would be really difficult to distinguish that between Irma damage. But if you wait a thousand days later and break a tile, it's going to have a different appearance, and you're easily able to exclude that damage. So the passage of time is not prejudicial. It actually helps you aid [sic] in your opinions regarding the cause of the damage." 1 The other two survivors said the same thing in their own registers. Shapiro's engineer, inspecting in 2022 on notice given 1,094 days after Irma, wrote that his inspection "did not demonstrate dull and rounded edges at the roof tile cracks consistent with being caused by other windstorm events that pre-date Hurricane Irma." 4 Stark's engineer said the "classic pattern of windstorm damage from Hurricane Wilma … was clearly evident upon the inspection which was conducted in 2010 and would have been evident upon an inspection by [the insurer]." 3
The losers volunteered the opposite. Kramer's own engineer wrote that "[f]oot traffic over the prior 11 years may have contributed to the breakage, though wind damage, in our opinion, was equally likely," on notice given roughly five years after the 2004 storms; the Fourth District quoted the carrier's rhetorical question approvingly and observed that the insureds' affidavit "bolstered the insurer's argument that it had been prejudiced." 2 In You Restorations, notice came 694 days after an unnamed April 26, 2020 storm and the insured's own expert conceded "multiple upgradient rainwater intrusions." Judge Warner drew the line that most causation reports still miss: the affidavit raised a fact issue on cause, but it did not rebut the presumption that late notice prejudiced the carrier's ability to determine the extent of the loss. 9 Wild Oak Bay's expert reached extent by excluding already-repaired areas from his analysis. 1
The delay numbers run the wrong way.
Winners waited 1,053, 1,094, and 1,232 days. 143 Losers waited 694, 732, and roughly five years. 952 The shortest-delay winner sat on the claim longer than two of the three losers, which means the length of your client's silence is not what the appellate courts are actually grading.
What this record does not support
The quantitative elements come from one case. Stark and Shapiro both survived summary judgment carrying no velocity-pressure math, no named standard, and no component failure threshold. 34 Nothing in this record makes ASCE calculations necessary to defeat a late-notice motion. The defensible claim is narrower and more useful: quantification is what made the trial court's "void of any meaningful quantitative analysis" finding unsustainable on appeal. 1 Quantification is armor against a particular judicial characterization, not an entry fee.
Report quality can also be beside the point. In the Fourth District's Perez, notice came 443 days after the loss and the insured's report expressly conceded that Tropical Storm Gordon exacerbated the damage. The affidavit still defeated summary judgment, because the burden sat on the carrier and Citizens "presented no such evidence" of prejudice. 6 A concession that killed Kramer was survivable there purely on burden allocation. If the Second District's reading of bundled post-loss duties spreads, more files will be decided on that axis than on affidavit content.
Stark needs a qualification. Anyone treating it as a content specification is reading past the second ground for reversal, because it rested equally on a public adjuster's affidavit relaying that the carrier's own investigator said there appeared to be storm damage. 3 A vicarious admission from the carrier's own file does work no engineering report can do. Read the Wild Oak Bay slip opinion in full before you brief any of this. 1

Five cells in the matrix are coded unknown. They stay that way. Appellate opinions describe affidavits selectively, and a panel that never mentions an inspection date is not telling you the affidavit omitted one, so reading silence as absence would overstate what this record shows and hand opposing counsel a correction you should have made yourself.
Sources cited
- SFR Services, LLC a/a/o Wild Oak Bay Owners Ass'n v. American Coastal Ins. Co., No. 2D2024-1947 (Fla. 2d DCA July 22, 2026) (slip op.)— Florida Second District Court of Appeal
- Kramer v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 95 So. 3d 303 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)— Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal
- Stark v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 95 So. 3d 285 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)— Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal
- Shapiro v. First Protective Ins. Co., 359 So. 3d 777 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023)— Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal
- Perez v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 343 So. 3d 140 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)— Florida Third District Court of Appeal
- Perez v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Co., 345 So. 3d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)— Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal
- Arce v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Co., 388 So. 3d 205 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024)— Florida Third District Court of Appeal
- Lassiter v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 386 So. 3d 646 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024)— Florida Second District Court of Appeal
- You Restorations, LLC v. First Protective Ins. Co., 417 So. 3d 365 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025)— Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal
- Bankers Ins. Co. v. Macias, 475 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 1985)— Supreme Court of Florida
- Fla. Stat. § 627.70132 — Notice of property insurance claim— The Florida Senate
The documentation lives where the claim does.
Photos, drying logs, scopes, and carrier correspondence land on the claim record as they happen, so the package you send the carrier is the file you actually worked.