Smoke plume rising over west Los Angeles at sunset on January 10, 2025, during the Palisades and Eaton fires

State legal — California

Who Has to Rebut California's New Smoke Presumption, and With What

The new smoke presumption is silent on the burden of proof, and the Evidence Code answer depends on why the Legislature wrote it.

By Andy Rouhafzai, Founder8 min read

Photo: Jengod / CC BY-SA 4.0 via Wikimedia Commons

In short

AB 1795 creates a rebuttable presumption that smoke residue in a surviving home in a wildfire impact zone ZIP was caused by the wildfire, but the act never says who carries the burden of proof to rebut it. Under Evidence Code sections 603 through 606, courts classify an unlabeled presumption by its purpose, and the act's health-and-safety findings support reading it as placing the burden of proof on the carrier. No court has decided the question.

The word "burden" appears once in AB 1795, in the legislative findings, where it describes a "significant financial burden to remediate."1 The act never uses the phrase "burden of proof," never mentions the Evidence Code, and never says what a carrier must bring to rebut the smoke presumption it writes into Insurance Code section 2060.1. Evidence Code sections 603 through 606 fill that silence, and the act's own findings give public adjusters the stronger argument about how.

Clocks and gaps in AB 1795
30 days
ACV of undisputed personal property restoration
From the inspection date, Sec. 2060.2(d)(2)
30 days
Undisputed dwelling RCV
From restoration completion under Sec. 570
0
Times "burden of proof" appears in the act
"Burden" appears once, in the findings
July 1, 2029
Adjuster certification program deadline
Sec. 14048(a); PA program in Sec. 15009.2

The presumption itself is one sentence. Section 2060.1(a) reads: "There is a rebuttable presumption that if wildfire smoke, ash, soot, char, or combustion byproducts are present in a surviving residential property in the wildfire impact zone after a wildfire, then smoke damage in the property is the result of that wildfire."1 The operative date and interest rules are covered in the earlier claimOS breakdown of when the act starts to bind. This post starts where a carrier says the soot came from somewhere else, and the volume is there: CDI counted "more than 13,000 smoke damage claims" after the January 2025 Los Angeles fires, as Insurance Journal reported.7

Every element of that sentence is a foundation fact the policyholder must establish first. The wildfire impact zone is "a ZIP Code within or partially within the fire perimeter, as described in paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) of Section 675.1," and the perimeter is the footprint or outer boundary of the burned area "as determined and mapped by the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection."1 "Surviving residential property" is not defined in the section. Section 675.1(b)(2) has CAL FIRE, in consultation with OES, give the commissioner data "sufficient for the commissioner to determine which ZIP Codes are within or adjacent to the fire perimeter," followed by a bulletin from the commissioner.4 AB 1795 keeps only the within-or-partially-within half of that list. CDI Bulletin 2025-1, dated January 9, 2025, lists 35 ZIP codes for the Palisades and Eaton fires, 12 and 23 respectively, and it does not separate within from adjacent.6 The statutory zone for those fires is a subset of that list, and nobody has published the subset yet.

If a client's ZIP could be adjacent rather than within, assume the carrier will check.

What do Evidence Code sections 603 through 606 do with an unlabeled presumption?

Section 600(a) defines a presumption as "an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action," and adds: "A presumption is not evidence."3 Section 601 sorts every rebuttable presumption into one of two kinds. Either it affects the burden of producing evidence, or it affects the burden of proof.3 The Code offers no third kind and no default.

The two kinds are defined by why they exist. Section 603 describes a production presumption as one "established to implement no public policy other than to facilitate the determination of the particular action in which the presumption is applied."3 Under section 604, its effect is to require the trier of fact to assume the presumed fact "unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence," after which the trier decides "from the evidence and without regard to the presumption," though inferences from the underlying facts may still be drawn.3 Section 605 describes the other kind, a presumption "established to implement some public policy other than to facilitate the determination of the particular action in which the presumption is applied," and among its listed examples is "the security of those who entrust themselves or their property to the administration of others."3 Under section 606, that kind imposes "upon the party against whom it operates the burden of proof as to the nonexistence of the presumed fact."3 When the Legislature does not label a presumption, the Law Revision Commission comment to section 603 says courts may classify it "by applying the standards contained in Sections 603 and 605."3 AB 1795 attaches no label, so the classification turns on what the presumption was built to do.

AB 1795 presumption fork: Evidence Code 603/604 production reading versus 605/606 burden-of-proof readingPresumption triggersresidue + surviving home + zone ZIPEvid. Code 603/604burden of producing evidenceEvid. Code 605/606burden of proofCarrier offers evidence thatwould support another causeCarrier must prove thenon-wildfire causePresumption drops; factfinderweighs the whole recordPresumed cause stands unlessthe carrier carries that burden
One trigger, two readings. Which branch applies depends on how a court classifies the presumption under Evidence Code sections 603 and 605.

On a smoke file where the residue is real and the source is genuinely mixed, the branch a court picks can decide who pays.

Section 2 findings and the Evid. Code 605 argument

Section 2(a)(6) finds: "It is in the best interest of Californians to protect the health and safety of residents ... by ensuring that their properties are returned to a safe and habitable condition."1 Section 2(a)(3) finds that "the lack of standards and unsettled case law have caused a patchwork of claims handling practices," and Section 2(b) states an intent to set standards "to ensure the health and safety of residents and for the proper handling of residential property insurance claims."1 Those findings reach well past speeding up one lawsuit. They concern habitability and the handling of an entire class of claims, which is the kind of outside public policy section 605 describes.

The 605 example fits the facts too. A homeowner whose smoke claim sits with a carrier has, in ordinary language, entrusted property to "the administration of others," although no court has applied that phrase to a claim under this act. "Insurers, not survivors, must bear the responsibility of proving that a home is safe," a statement attributed to Gipson, per the CDI release 9/15/2026.2 A press release is not legislative history, but it shows how the regulator read the bill on signing day.

The closest case is an analogy only. In O'Connell v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 54, Unemployment Insurance Code section 1256 said only that a claimant "is presumed" to have been discharged for reasons other than misconduct and that the presumption "is rebuttable." The court held that "The rebuttable presumption in Unemployment Insurance Code section 1256 is one which affects the burden of proof," relying on Perales v. Department of Human Resources Dev. (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 332.5 The O'Connell court reasoned from precedent and procedural consistency rather than from section 605's policy test, and this research found no California decision that classifies an unlabeled presumption explicitly on 605 grounds. It still shows a court reading a bare "rebuttable" label as a burden-of-proof presumption, enough for a demand letter or a memo to coverage counsel.

If a court reads it as production only

The carrier-side reading already has a public voice. Defense counsel Brandon Sipple of Kennedys described the statute to Insurance Journal as "principally a causation presumption, not a presumption that every surviving home in the wildfire impact zone sustained smoke damage."7 That fits a section 603 reading: a causation shortcut meant to move individual disputes along. Under section 604, the presumption would last only until the carrier introduces evidence that "would support a finding of its nonexistence."3 After that, the factfinder weighs the whole record without the presumption. Inferences from residue found in a zone ZIP after a fire still count.

Either way, the carrier has to produce something, and the statute shows where it will look. Section 2060.1(e)(4) excludes from wildfire smoke damage any smoke, soot, ash, char, fumes or particulate matter "resulting from agricultural, industrial, or commercial operations or routine residential activities unrelated to a covered wildfire," and it excludes exterior elements such as vegetation and soil.1 Rebuttal will arrive as an alternative source: a nearby commercial operation, a fireplace, cooking, candles, tobacco. Or the carrier will attack a foundation fact by arguing there is no residue, the house is not "surviving," or the ZIP sits outside the zone. The presumption goes to cause, though. It does not establish how much damage exists or what restoration costs, which still get proved with scope, pricing and testing.

How each reading plays out on a smoke file
QuestionBurden of producing (603/604)Burden of proof (605/606)
When does the presumption stop working?Once the carrier introduces evidence that would support a finding of non-wildfire causeIt stays in place until the carrier proves the non-wildfire cause
How is causation decided after rebuttal?From the evidence, without the presumption; inferences still allowedAgainst the carrier unless it carries the burden of proof
Main argument for itCarrier framing as a causation shortcutSection 2 health-and-safety findings; the 605 example on entrusted property
Closest California analogy foundNone identifiedO'Connell (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 54, by analogy only
Does it prove amount of loss?✕✕
Typical rebuttal evidenceExcluded source, or an attack on a foundation factExcluded source, or an attack on a foundation fact

The classification fight matters even though both readings call for similar rebuttal evidence. Under 604 a thin lab report can knock the presumption out of the case; under 606 that thin report has to persuade.

Carriers rarely say which reading they are applying, so read the denial for the tell, because a letter that cites one sampling result and stops is betting on section 604.

Exhibits, clocks and clearance

Build each foundation fact as its own exhibit: the ZIP code tied to CAL FIRE's mapped perimeter and any CDI list under section 675.1, proof the structure survived, dated photographs and sampling showing residue after the fire, with the sampler's name and method on the page, and a timeline from the fire date to the first inspection. A presumption missing one foundation fact never triggers under either reading of the Evidence Code, and a carrier will look for the missing one first.

Then make the carrier commit. Ask in writing which excluded source and which clause of section 2060.1(e)(4) it relies on, and request the lab report, the sampling method and the name of the person who collected the samples. Document pre-loss conditions before the carrier does: whether the house has a fireplace, whether anyone smoked indoors, the HVAC filter change history, any pre-fire photographs. Section 2060.1(d) preserves the Unfair Trade Practices Act, Sections 2070 and 2071, and the Fair Claims Settlement Practices Regulations, so a denial built on a vague source theory still answers to those rules.1 For investigation duties in litigation, see the Linsao bad-faith investigation write-up.

Calendar the clocks from the right trigger dates. Under section 2060.2(d)(2), unless the policyholder agrees to let the insurer restore, the ACV of the undisputed cost to restore damaged personal property is due "as soon as practicable, but no later than 30 calendar days from the date the property was inspected."1 Undisputed dwelling RCV is due "within 30 calendar days from the date upon which the restoration has been completed pursuant to Section 570."1 Section 570 completion centers on a licensed contractor finishing the work to the owner's satisfaction, so file that paperwork the day the work ends.

Clearance comes before sign-off. Section 2060.2(f) provides that once a property "has been restored to preloss condition and cleared for human occupancy," the claim "shall not be reopened due to recontamination," and a recontamination claim "shall be considered a new claim, subject to policy provisions and a new deductible."1 Get clearance testing documented before the client signs anything that reads as completion. Clearance also controls ALE. Section 2060.1(b) bars ALE termination until the property is restored to preloss condition and cleared for human occupancy, subject to the policy limit, so ALE cut at the contractor's final walkthrough, before any clearance result, is cut early.1

Plead both theories. The demand should argue that section 2060.1(a) is a section 605 presumption that puts the burden of proof on the non-wildfire cause with the carrier, cite the Section 2 findings and O'Connell by analogy, and then show the file wins under section 604 anyway because the carrier's rebuttal evidence is thin. If the carrier's adjuster changes partway through a long smoke file, check the SB 876 adjuster reassignment rule as well. The claimOS page for public adjusters covers how claim files like these are organized.

Watch the certification dates too. Section 14048(a) directs that "On or before July 1, 2029, the department shall develop a training and certification program" for company adjusters, section 15009.2(a) creates a training and certification program for public insurance adjusters, and the act provides that a violation is "an unfair practice subject to Article 6.5."1

What this does not settle

No published California case applies sections 603 or 605 to AB 1795, so the burden question stays open until a court or the Legislature answers it. The statutory quotations here rest on the chaptered text posted by CalMatters Digital Democracy, because the official legislative text could not be opened, and the Evidence Code language comes from a published version of sections 600 through 607 rather than a fresh check of the current code. As of November 8, 2026, no CDI bulletin implementing the act had been found, including any list that separates within-perimeter ZIP codes from adjacent ones.

Sources cited

  1. AB 1795 chaptered text (Ch. 240, Stats. 2026)— CalMatters Digital Democracy
  2. CDI press release, Sept. 15, 2026— California Department of Insurance
  3. California Evidence Code sections 600-607— Justia
  4. California Insurance Code section 675.1— FindLaw
  5. O'Connell v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 54— Justia
  6. CDI Bulletin 2025-1 (Palisades and Eaton fire ZIP codes)— California Department of Insurance
  7. Insurance Journal, Oct. 8, 2026— Insurance Journal

Statutory clocks, tracked on every file.

claimOS calendars these deadlines automatically on each claim: acknowledgement, decision, payment, and the suit limitation, each with its code section attached and visible to the whole team.